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The United States Navy currently owns 532 foreign-
produced equipments and this number is expected to increase
as a consequence of U. S. commitments to NATO. Supply support
of these equipments is vital to the missions of the Navy.
This thesis begins with an examination of the international
cooperative programs between the United States and other
NATO nations which provide the United States Armed Services
with foreign-manufactured equipments. The current procedures
of the U. S. Navy's Ship Parts Control Center for determining
the initial and follow-on supply support for both U. S. and
foreign-manufactured equipments is then reviewed. The prob-
lems associated with the support of the 532 foreign equipments
are identified. Finally, suggestions for improvements in the
present support procedures are made.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this interdependent world, the United States Armed
Forces are employing more and more foreign-manufactured
weapon systems and equipments. Three factors caused the
increased use of foreign equipment: (1) The standardization
of weapon systems among NATO nations, (2) Offsets, and
(3) The availability of lower-priced quality items abroad.
In the last ten years many studies have been conducted
on how to support weapon systems and equipments that the
United States has sold to other countries. The Navy Material
Command (NAVMAT) and Navy Supply System Command (NAVSUP)
have recently established offices to coordinate the policies
and procedures the Navy utilizes in providing support to
other countries. However, little research has been conducted
on the nature and extent of the support of equipments pur-
chased by the United States from other countries. This study
was done to fill that void.
This study examines the international cooperative pro-
grams between the United States and other countries which
provided the U. S. with foreign equipment, what procedures
have been used to support this equipment, and what changes
are required for the effective support of foreign equipment.
It begins with a review of different foreign policy programs
through which the United States cooperates with other coun-
tries. In particular the programs of codevelopment , coproduction

and offset are studies and evaluated because they dominate
the procurement of foreign-manufactured equipment for the
U. S. Military Services. Some of the factors included in
the evaluation are: (1) balance of payment, (2) availability
of resources, (3) willingness to cooperate, (4) national
pride, (5) trade restrictions (business and legal) , and
(6) national engineering standards.
Because the supply of spares and repair parts is essen-
tial to the effective deployment of any weapon system, the
United States policies and procedures for providing initial
and follow-on support are then reviewed for both domestic
and foreign items. The purpose of this review is to identify
areas where changes can be made to increase the supply
effectiveness of foreign-manufactured equipments.
The third phase of this study is an attempt to determine
the magnitude of foreign equipments. A listing of all
equipment and their Federal Supply Code for Manufacturers was
provided by SPCC. In order to determine the manufacturing
country and type of equipment, copies of the Allowance Parts
List (APL) were obtained from the master files at Naval Supply
Center, Oakland, California. In reviewing these APLs, ques-
tions arose concerning the assignment of stock numbers and
the collecting of demands for items not stocked in the supply
system. A visit was made to SPCC, NAVSUP , and Naval Sea




System Command (NAVSEA) to interview personnel as part of
the effort to obtain answers to those questions and details
about the present procedures used for support of foreign-
manufactured equipments.
The fourth phase presents alternative methods for pro-
viding more effective initial and follow-on supply support
for foreign manufactured equipments. With the increased
emphasis on the United States to purchase more foreign equip-
ment, a recommendation is made for additional studies on the
support of foreign-manufactured equipment; several topics




A. MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANT AID
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created
in 1949. This treaty created an opportunity to reorganize
all defense production with a view to making the most eco-
nomical use of limited funds and manpower by utilizing fewer
and more efficient sources of production and supply. (3: 187)
In the early years of the alliance, the European members
received enormous quantities of surplus defense materials,
chiefly of World War II vintage, from the United States under
the Military Assistance Grant Aid Program.
The Grant Aid Program has been an important contributing
factor to the initiation of coproduction programs by the
European members of the alliance in two ways. First, it pro-
vided United States-made equipment to European countries to
enable them to commence coproduction of an American-made
weapon. Second, it served as an impetus to European coun-
tries to organize "follow-on" cooperation development and
coproduction institutions and programs to modify and improve
upon earlier generation weapons. (3: 30)
Over the past thirty years Grant Aid has taken the form
of both contributions of military equipment, weapons, and
services that were granted without reimbursement to allies
and friendly nations and training of foreign friendly nations'
officers and enlisted men at United States service schools.
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Although Grant Aid has been almost completely phased out for
nations of Western Europe, some aid is still being given to
countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. (3: 187)
The Military Assistance Grant Aid Program was accelerated
by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This act provided the
authority to furnish military assistance without charge to
eligible foreign countries that shared a determination to
resist the expansionism of communist-inspired aggression, but
lacked the means to finance the full cost. The material,
logistic support, and related training furnished under this
type of assistance was tailored to bolster the recipients
internal security and self defense. This act was amended in
1975 and now the President must advise Congress before any
foreign assistance program can be undertakne.
Within the overall Military Assistance Grant Aid Programs,
recipient countries are categorized according to the nature
of the objectives of the military assistance being provided.
The following is a list of special program categories used:
1. Forward Defense Programs
Forward Defense Programs provide assistance to those
countries exposed to a direct threat of communist aggression
because of their geographical proximity of Soviet bloc but
which do not have resources to provide for their own defenses.
2. Alliance For Progress Security Programs
Alliance for Progress Security Programs have as their
objectives the establishing of a Latin American military
leadership dedicated to democratic constitutional order.
13

maintaining internal security, and promoting social and
economic development. These are mainly programs for main-
tenance of internal security and civic action programs,
although they are contained within the scope of the Military
Assistance Program.
3. Military Base Programs
Military Base Programs provide military assistance
to countries in which the United States has access to military
bases and installations essential to the deployment of the
United States military strength in support of planned strategy
4
.
Grant Aid Phase-Out Programs
Grant Aid Phase-Out Programs are those which provide
for fulfillment of prior year commitments to economically
recovered nations.
5. Free-World Orientation Programs
Free-World Orientation Programs provide modest amounts
of military assistance to a number of underdeveloped and
emerging nations where it is important to the security inter-
ests of the United States and the common defense of the Free
World to encourage resistance to the extension of communist
influence.
6 U. S. Force Support and Military Assistance Program
U. S. Force Support and Military Assistance Program
administration is essentially an "all other" category. It
includes a share of the costs involved in support of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Infrastructure and International
Military Headquarters. Also included in this category are
14

the Department of Defense's costs involved in administering
and managing of these special military assistance programs. (3: 32)
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM
The Foreign Military Sales Program was originated in 1961
as an effort to reduce and ultimately terminate grant aid to
any country having sufficient resources to equip and maintain
its own military forces. The goal of the Foreign Military
Sales Program is to supplement, augment, and, together with
cooperative development and coproduction, eventually replace
Grant Aid Assistance to the maximum degree possible. (20: 3)
The United States has conducted intensified efforts to
promote international sales of U. S. Military equipment since
1961. In doing so, the United States has had three dominant
aims:
To promote the defensive strength of the
allies, consistent with U. S. political-
economic objectives.
To promote the concept of cooperative logis-
tics standardization with allies.
To offset the unfavorable balance of payment
resulting from essential U. S. military
deployment abroad. (3: 35)
The sales program is directed toward making available to
friendly foreign nations those defense articles and services
not generally available for purchase by nations through U. S.
commercial sources. Sales of unclassified military articles
may be made directly from commercial sources up to $25 million
limitation. However, if the articles are classified or can
15

best be provided through Department of Defense courses, they
may be furnished by either withdrawal from existing stocks
or initiating procurement action for the country.
Prior to entering into a contract for procurement, the
foreign country must have provided a "dependable undertaking".
This means a firm commitment by the purchasing country that
it will pay the full cost of new production or the perfor-
mance of defense services. Under a dependable undertaking,
the purchaser agrees to make funds available in such amounts
and at such times as may be necessary to meet the payment
required by the contract. Also the country agrees to assume
any damages or costs that may accrue from their cancellation
of this contract'.
The Military Assistance Appropriation (Category 6 of the
preceding section) may be used at times to finance sales to
eligible countries. Credit is provided to authorized coun-
tries on terms calling for repayment with interest. When
military assistance funds used to extend such, credit are
repaid, they are credited to the existing military assistance
appropriation and are available for the purpose of furnishing
further cash or credit terms. (3: 36)
C. BEGINNINGS OF COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT
In 1949, Belgium and the Netherlands were the first to
attempt to join together in the production of an experimental
military aircraft. The effort was unsuccessful. (3: 190) It
was not until 1954 that a successful multinational project
16

came about. Several NATO countries decided to pool their
efforts to design and produce a "NATO Lightweight Strike-
Fighter" aircraft. After the Supreme Allied Command (Europe)
prepared the general specifications, designs were drawn up
and three prototypes were developed and constructed. One
design survived the testing, the Italian FIAT G-91, equipped
with a British Bristol Orpheus engine and a French landing
gear. It was produced in Italy and the Federal Republic of
Germany. The aircraft entered into squadron air force service
in both countries. (8: 126)
Encouraged by the success of this jointly produced air-
craft, the newly formed NATO Defense Production Committee
started a similar project in 1957 to produce a new maritime
patrol aircraft. Operational characteristics were issued by
NATO military authorities and circulated to aircraft manu-
facturers. This was the first time that a group of nations
undertook jointly the design and development based on opera-
tional requirements. (8: 127)
The United States should be credited with accelerating the
NATO coordinated production of military systems that followed.
At a Paris meeting of NATO heads of government in December,
1957, Secretary of State Dulles called for the initiation in
Europe of a coordinated program of research, development and
production for a selected group of modern weapon systems.
This was followed by a .United States Government formal offer
to make available American technical knowledge and experience
in manufacturing modern weapons. The NATO nations quick
17

response to the offer made it possible to complete arrange-
ments for joint production of two missiles, the ground-to-
air Hawk, and the air-to-air Sidewinder. (3: 195)
The number and variety of weapons continued to expand
rapidly during the 1960 's, ranging from the adaptation of the
U. S. Mark 44 torpedo by Italy and France, to the joint pro-
duction of battle tanks, and the development of vertical or
short take-off and landing aircraft. The greatest coproduc-
tion attempts in this period was a five-nation joint program
which produced over 1,000 United States developed F-104G
Super Starfighter aircraft. (7: 33)
The United States and other NATO countries have continued
to have exchange programs and coproduction of weapon systems.
From 1967 to 1975, the United States was involved with eighteen
countries in coproduction projects for sixty-five different
items. (19: 20) A list of coproduction agreements from 1960
through 197 5 is provided in Appendix A.
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III. PROGRAMS UTILIZED IN OBTAINING FOREIGN EQUIPMENT
The United States, in an effort to modernize and stan-
dardize NATO Nations' defenses, has embarked on cooperative
programs with other countries. These programs are "codevel-
opment" , "coproduction" , and "offsets" and have been defined
by the Department of Defense as follows:
Codevelopment — The sharing of the financial
and technological responsibilities for
developing an item, subsystem or system.
Coproduction — Any program wherein the United
States Government, under the protection of an
international agreement, either directly
through the Arms Export Control Program or
indirectly through specific licensing arrange-
ments by designated commercial producer to
acquire substantial "know how" to manufacture
or assemble, repair, maintain, and operate, in
whole or in part, a specific weapon, communi-
cation or support system, or an individual
military item.
Offset — A procedure in which the seller agrees
to purchase items, subsystems or systems from
the country purchasing the defense equipment to
offset a portion of the sale price of the
equipment. (14: 2)
A. COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS
1. Current U. S. Policy
The policies for the current approach to cooperative
programs was set forth by both President Ford and President
Carter. In an address to the North Atlantic Council in
Brussels during 197 5, in support of the North Atlantic Treaty




A generation after its creation, the
alliance wastes vast sums each year, sacri-
ficing military effectiveness. We have
simply not done enough to standardize our
weapons. We must correct this. We must
also agree among ourselves on a sensible
division of weapons development programs
and productions responsibilities. (17: 5)
President Carter spoke to a similar foum on 10 May
1977. His remarks at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Ministerial House, Lancaster House, England included:
There have been real increases in allied
defense spending. But difficult economic
conditions set practical limits. We need to
use limited resources wisely, particularly in
strengthening conventional forces. To this
end:
— We must combine, coordinate, and concert
our national programs more effectively.
— We must find better ways to bring new
technology into our armed forces.
— We must give higher priority to increasing
the readiness of these forces.
The long-term defense program should empha-
size greater alliance cooperation to ensure
that our combined resources are used more
effectively. It should take full advantage
of work already done within the alliance.
As we strengthen our forces, we should
also improve cooperation in development, pro-
duction and procurement of alliance defense
equipment. The alliance should not be weakened
militarily by waste and overlapping. Nor
should it be weakened politically by disputes
over where to buy defense equipment. (5: vii)
The Chief Executives have not been alone in focusing
attention on NATO and foreign weapon procurement. Congress
also supports this effort. It has been the opinion of Con-
gress for several years that the United States should consider
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foreign weapons. In fact, since 1976, it has been the policy
of Congress that the United States make an annual evaluation
to determine if foreign systems can meet our requirements. (17: 23)
Military leaders have repeatedly expressed concern
about military mix of weapons present in the European theater.
On 15 January 1977, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
presented to Congress the third report on Rationalization
and Standardization within NATO. In this report he outlined
the DOD's support of Weapon System Standardization in NATO
and included a large section of the U. S. consideration of
European weapon systems, (17: 7)
Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, while serving as Director
of Defense Research and Engineering, supported cooperative
research and development efforts with NATO allies. In a report
to Congress in January, 197 7, he reported on cooperative
efforts to reduce the shortfall between the United States
Research Development, Test and Engineering (RDT&E) Program
and that of the Soviets by making greater use of the allied
RDT&E Programs. The other objective was to increase NATO
military force effectiveness in meeting its world-wide
commitments beyond NATO. (4: viii-2)
Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Andrew
Goodpaster reported in 1974 that the lack of equipment stan-
dardization in the alliance and the rampant proliferation
of separate equipments and systems has reduced the effective-
ness of the allied forces in Europe by about thirty percent.
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In central Europe alone NATO forces have twenty-three
different families of combat aircraft, seven different
families of main battle tanks, eight different families of
armored personnel carriers and twenty-two different families
of anti-tank weapons. NATO's naval forces have six differ-
ent anti-ship missiles, eight different surface-to-air
missiles, thirty-six different air control radards, and
twenty different calibers of weapons over 30 mm. (16: 157)
2. Current U. S. Participation
The United States, by September, 1976, was involved
in twenty-nine international cooperative programs with
twelve other countries. While some of these international
cooperative programs were multilateral, most were bilateral
agreements.
One of the largest cooperative programs the United
States has been involved in is a multilateral coproduction
program for the F-16 with four NATO countries. This coopera-
tion program has planned aircraft orders as follows: United
States Air Force 650, Belgium 102, Netherlands 84, Denmark
48, and Norway 75. The program requires that ten percent
of the United States aircraft or their subsystems and forty
percent of the European consortium aircraft or their sub-
systems be built in Europe. In addition, fifteen percent of
aircraft or their subsystems ordered in the future by non-
NATO countries will be built in Europe. (6: 593)
22

3. Advantages to the United States
Bilateral and multilateral cooperative development
and production programs have the potential of offering advan-
tages to all countries involved. From the United States'
point of view, the pooling of economic and technical resources
in developing and producing standardized defense equipment
can result in the following benefits:
a. Cost Benefits
A primary incentive for becoming involved in
international cooperative (codevelopment and/or coproduction)
programs is the potential for reduced development costs. By-
teaming up with other countries who share in the development
cost, or by allowing the coproducing countries to specialize
in the manufacturing of subsystems or items which they can
produce economically, the U. S. Department of Defense may be
able to provide its operational forces with equipment at a
lower initial cost. For example, the Air Force has esti-
mated a savings of fifty percent on the Side-Looking airborne
radar — a cooperative advanced development between the United
States and the Republic of Germany. All of the work is being
done in the United States but the cost is to be shared
equally. (20: 10)
Another example of cost savings is the agreement
between the United States and the United Kingdom for the
development of fuel cells. The objective is to develop an
efficient, advanced, low-cost electrical power source. The
work has been divided equally, with each country funding its
23

share . Each country will have full rights to the results
of this joint effort. (20: 11)
b. Technical Benefits
Foreign scientific talent and technical expertise
can fill gaps in the United States research and development.
In certain areas, such as forward area air defense, armored
vehicles, sonars, metals research, and shallow-water acous-
tic research, European technological ability is regarded as
being equal to or better than that of the United States. (20: 12)
Typical projects receiving this benefit were the
Navy's shallow-water acoustic research program with the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands for gathering
basic hydroacoustic data and the research program with the
United Kingdom involving the Planar Array Sonar. In the latter
case, the Navy had concentrated on increasing the capability
of its AN/SQS-26 Sonar rather than incur high costs for a
surface ship sonar called Planar Array. Fortunately, the
United Kingdom was doing advanced development work in this
area; and, by entering into a bilateral cooperative program,
the United States was able to capitalize on the United King-
dom's efforts. For an estimated contribution of twenty-five
percent of the program cost, the Navy obtained rights to
designs, concepts and data not otherwise available. (19: 25)
c. Access to Different Geographical Areas
Often, the Department of Defense must develop a
piece of equipment that will operate in all types of environ^
mental and geographical conditions. Participation in cooperative
24

programs may permit the United States to test such equipment
in geographical areas which might not otherwise be available.
One such program in which this benefit has been
realized is the Azores fixed acoustic range. The United States,
along with seven other nations, have entered into a multi-
lateral international cooperative program to establish the
Azores acoustic range. The Azores area has the most desired
environmental and geographical conditions for testing voice
communications through water. (20: 5)
4
.
Obstacles to Cooperative Programs
Initiating and participating in an international
codevelopment and coproduction program has not been easy
because of various formidable obstacles. Some of these not
only prevent programs from starting but they also influence
the nature and outcome of programs which do start.
a. Balance of Payment
The balance of payment considerations have become
a crucial negotiating point in determining cost-and^effort
sharing arrangements on cooperative programs. (20: 16) The
fluctuations in international monetary exchange rates can
complicate the problem and cause a redistribution of burdens
and benefits on programs in which participants exchange funds.
b. Fear of Eroding the Employment Base
Because much of the codevelopment and coproduction
work would be done outside of the United States, it could be
argued that such programs lead to increasing the United States
25

unemployment. However, employment is not affected when work
is split among participating countries with each country
paying only for its own work. (20: 19)
Various measures have been adopted to protect
the domestic employment base. One of the more well-known
measures is the Buy American Act (41 U. S. C. 10a), which is
concerned primarily with restricting the acquisition of foreign
goods and supplies. However, the Secretary of Defense can
wave this restriction if national security considerations
require it. There is also the Department of Defense Appro-
priation Act (Public Law 92-57 0) which bars the Department
of Defense from spending research and development dollars
abroad when a United States company can do the same work at
a lower cost.
c. Technological Capabilities
The technological superiority of the United States
in a substantial number of scientific and technical areas
is well established among NATO nations. The U. S. is reluc-
tant to share this knowledge because it does not want to take
the risk of losing its competitive edge over other countries.
An example of this is the U. S. refusal to provide certain
information to European countries on the wire-guided torpedo
program. (2: 17)
d. Military Security
Military security restrictions may limit inter-
national cooperative research and development among the allies
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in certain defense areas. Within the United States, partici-
pation in an international cooperative research and production
program in the defense area must operate within military
security limits and national disclosure policies. (20: 24)
This obstacle is noticed in that the United States is reluc-
tant to share any technical and scientific knowledge on
strategic weapons with NATO countries which are near a Soviet
bloc country.
e. Availability of Resources
The resource constraint is an ever-present dis-
advantage to defense cooperative programs. Cooperative pro-
grams are designed to reduce the financial burden to partici-
pating countries. Nevertheless, a lack of money, particularly
among smaller nations, reduces cooperative efforts. Examples
of this are Portugal being forced to drop out of the Seasparrow
Surface Ship Self-Defense Missile Program and Canada having
to abandon its involvement with the Hydrofoil. (20: 25)
f. Willingness to Cooperate
The willingness to cooperate appears to be some-
what different for the United States than for its allies.
To the United States, such programs are a means of reducing
development costs, achieving standardization, avoiding costly
duplication, and exploiting the benefits its foreign allies
have to offer. The allies view such programs as a means of





g. Differences in Coproduction Policies
Differences in coproduction policies are also a
major disadvantage to international cooperative programs.
To the allies, cooperative research and development go hand-
in-hand with cooperative production. In European cooperative
programs, development and production costs and markets are
shared.
The Department of Defense prefers not to combine
coproduction with codevelopment because of domestic employment
considerations. (9: 41) However, it has not been able to get
cooperative programs started on engineering development in-
volving large systems unless coproduction has been part of
the agreement. This was true of Project Mallard, the XJ-99
vertical takeoff engine, the NATO Seasparrow, and the NATO
Hydrofoil fast patrol boat. (20: 22)
h. Subassemblies and Component Parts
Before the United States embarks on a coproduction
program with another country, a determination must be made
regarding the availability of subassemblies and component
parts to support the program. Over-optimism as to what is
actually available from the coproducing nations has led to
serious production disruptions when it was discovered that
the support equipment is unavailable. This becomes an even
more acute problem when there are shortages of long lead-




5. Barriers to Codevelopment and Coproduction
The advantages of international programs are attrac-
tive. Nations avoid duplication of efforts by sharing in
development, and benefit from the reductions in costs. In
addition, cooperative projects potentially aid in lowering
trade barriers, strengthening alliances and security in the
free world, and promoting international harmony and under-
standing. Yet, success is not guaranteed for cooperative
programs. In fact, failures are more frequent. (2: 13)
There are barriers to success which are numerous and often
deep rooted.
a. National Pride and Self-interest
Nationalism is a fact of international life and
is the United States' number one barrier to cooperative
codevelopment and coproduction programs. (2: 15) The reluc-
tance to cooperate is attributable to the "not wanted here"
or the "not invented here" syndrome. No matter what for-
eigners develop, it is not considered by some to be as good
as that of their own country. Likewise, many do not want to
depend on a foreign supplier, because they fear it could
compromise their national interests at some time in the future,
b. Trade Restrictions
Protectionism has been a serious drawback to
international cooperation. Each nation has established taxes
and customs which were designed to protect the national inter-
ests of that nation. In negotiating cooperative agreements
related to international coproduction and acquisitions.
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nations must compromise on these national trade arrangements
.
At the start of the Hawk Program, a successful coproduction
venture with our European allies, taxes and duty rights had
to be suspended by the United States. (2: 17)
c. Business and Legal
The conduct of commerce is not standardized among
countries of the free world. Business and financial practices,
credit policies, and contracting methods vary significantly.
The differences are exemplified by variations in accounting
practices. The treatment of cost allocation, valuation and
disclosures in Europe is not consistent with accepted U. S.
procedures. Contingency reserves, surplus entries, property,
plant and equipment, considerations of financial statements,
and rental commitments are among the entries that are handled
differently. (2: 20) This incompatibility between systems
makes it difficult to negotiate contracts equitable to all
parties.
Legal problems are also troublesome. International
laws relating to patents and proprietary data do not exist.
In addition, the related national laws vary greatly from one
nation to another. Reaching agreements with respect to
licensing and the use of data has been a major bottleneck. (2: 20)
d. National Engineering Standards
From a technical standpoint, the most mentioned
obstacles relate to differences in national engineering stan-
dards. The metric system is the most common. Other differences
30

in standards include the gauge of sheet metal, plate, wire,
the soldering of electronic components and the format of
engineering drawings. (2: 18)
An example of the problems of different standards
was illustrated by the Field Artillery Firing Radar (RATAC)
.
This radar was a joint development of the French and Germans
which was purchased for immediate use in Southeast Asia by
the United States. After modification of this radar to meet
United States standards, it became a common stocked item in
the United States inventory. During modification phases, it
was noted that the soldering on the European version was
too thin to meet U. S. standards. The thicker soldering
required larger parts to withstand the additional heat. The
larger parts could not fit in the European housing and hence
the housing had to be redesigned. (2: 10)
e. Language Barriers
Translators are available in NATO countries to
overcome most general language problems. However, technical
words frequently take on new meaning in translation due to
refinements in languages. Also, occasionally, there is not
a word equivalent existing in the second language. (3: 182)
B. OFFSETS AMONG NATO COUNTRIES
Efforts to standardize the weapon systems that NATO mem-
bers procure have encountered resistance within the alliance
primarily due to reasons of economic self-interest and national
pride. These concerns have resulted in demands for "offsets"
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whenever a new weapon system is under consideration for stan-
dardized NATO-wide procurement. The demand is for the producing
country to buy some equipment from the purchasing country
to offset part of the monetary expenditure associated with
the planned initial procurement of the weapon system.
In most cases, a foreign military sale is for only a few
units of equipment. Therefore, it is virtually impossible for
an offset agreement to be on a unit for unit basis, particu-
larly if the foreign government is not involved in the devel-
opment of the system. A common practice to meet offset commit-
ments is to identify subsystems or components and agree to
purchase some or all of these items to meet DOD requirements
providing a satisfactory price, schedule and quality can be
obtained. Another approach is for a contractor or subcon-
tractor to purchase items of like technology for commercial
applications
.
The domestic considerations in most developed countries
requires that local industry benefit from significant govern-
ment purchases. While offsets complicate foreign military
sales, they frequently are essential if NATO countries are
to own and operate standardized military equipment. Therefore,
it frequently becomes desirable to enter into an offset
arrangement, either (1) on the purchase and sale of defense
equipment, or (2) on an individual sale.
1. Department of Defense Policy
The U. S. Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to
the Secretaries of the Military Departments and other Defense
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Agencies, set forth the DOD policy for all offset agreements.
The following is a brief sinnmary of this policy:
a. Offset agreements are to be approved by the
Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense after the appro-
val of the Department of State.
b. Offset agreements should be negotiated and a basic
understanding reached prior to the final acceptance of the
United States Department of Defense offer and acceptance
contract (DOD Form 1513 FMS) by the foreign customer in order
to include in this letter of offer the impact that such
agreements may have on DOD Price and Availability.
c. Offset agreements will include guidelines con-
cerning any restrictions of acceptability of compettion from
foreign government-owned or subsidized companies.
d. On the sale of a particular item or items where
an offset agreement has been reached prior to the signing of
the contract, the offset will not officially begin until after
the contract has been signed.
e. In offset agreements related to specific weapon
system purchases, the United States contractors and associated
subcontractors which benefit from the foreign military sale
will assume the primary responsibility for fulfilling the
offset.
f. Foreign firms have the basic responsibility for
marketing their products to United States industry and DOD.
g. Procurement of all items by DOD shall be open
to participation by foreign firms under such offset agreements
to the extent provided in the agreement.
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h. DOD will allow foreign firms in those nations
having offset agreements the same access to and knowledge
of DOD's requirements as afforded any United States firm
within the provisions of the National Disclosure Policy and
DOD Industrial Security Guidance.
i. Offset agreements shall be stated in fiscal dollars
or some definable percentage related to constant-year dollars.
In the event of currency fluctuations, the agreed amount will
be the constant-year dollars and exchange rate at the time of
the offset agreement final signature. (14: 6)
2. Approaches and Arguments to Offsets
"Offsets" are non-tariff distortions to international
trade because they force transactions to take place that
normal market incentives would not induce. Offsets there-
fore tend to create inefficiencies and raise costs associated
with standardized weapons procurements. (21; 6)
Initially, there were two approaches to the offset
programs. One approach, which was termed "protectionist",
was based on a guaranteed and equal flow of procurement between
the United States and the purchasing country. The second was
termed "competitive" and, while seeking to obtain agreements
within NATO on standardized procurement needs of the alliance,
left determination of the magnitude of the offset open to
competitive bidding among potential suppliers. (21: 21)
One of the major arguments raised by NATO countries
against competitive bidding is that European defense industry
is too small and fragemented to compete effectively against
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United States' firms in the development and production of
any major weapon systems. The so-called "technology gap"
that many of the American firms have over the potential
European competitors is a decisive advantage to the United
States. Another advantage is the lower unit cost which re-
sults from the larger production runs possibly due to the
size of the United States defense procurements. (21: 23)
.
A common practice now used by the United States to
soften the "winner-take-all" policy is to identify subsys- •
tems or components which can be produced competitively in
the foreign country and have the prime contractor agree to
purchase some or all of those items from the foreign source
in meeting United States DOD requirements, provided that
satisfactory price, schedule, and quality can be obtained.
As a final argument there has been a subtle inconsis-
tency in American policy toward Europe for more than two
decades. (21: 24) On one hand, the United States has tried
to promote development of an European community as an integrated
and independent political-economic entity; while, on the other
hand, American policy has tried to promote the NATO alliance
as a more integrated and effective military entity through
the use of U. S. manufactured systems. This inconsistency
arises from the fact that efforts to promote the economic and
plitical integration of Europe require preferential treatment.
To enact this treatment would require the liberalization of
tariffs and government contracting regulations with foreign
countries. But the difficulties of obtaining such liberalizations
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have forced many of the United States procurements to be
made from its own producers rather than from other NATO
countries
.
The United States Department of State has searched
for areas of production in which costs of European NATO coun-
tries are competitive with those of U. S. producers. For
such areas, the Unites States has initiated trade liberali-
zations in order to open additional non-military markets.
These new markets could stimulate employment and provide
resources for further technological development, thereby




IV. PROVISIONING OF SYSTEMS STOCK
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY
The Department of Defense policy for stockage criteria
and the determination of requirements for secondary item
spares and repair parts, beginning with the initial provi-
sioning stage, is set forth in the DOD Instruction 4140.42
of 7 August 1974. The scope of this policy covers all spares
and repair parts in support of end items of material acquired
by the DOD or its components.
The Department of Defense Instruction 4140.42 requires
the DOD components to provide maximum initial support wihin
available resources. This is to be implemented through poli-
cies that provide a coordinated approach to the following
elements: Program development, depth of stocks provided in
the initial requirements computation, range of items selected
for initial stockage, and requirements estimation from the
beginning of a new program to the end of the Demand Develop-
ment Period (DDP)
.
To facilitaate implementation of this policy, DOD has
also provided some requirements determination guidelines and
mathematical models to aid the DOD components. Changes can
be made to these requirements but only to hedge against the
probability of overprocurement . Changes to the models must
have a financial base as established by the Department of
Defense and an objective of minimizing system downtime or
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time-weighted requisitions short. The control over these
modifications are at the headquarters level responsible for
logistics and material support for that DOD component.
The DOD components are required to review each new item
against a DOD standard basis for stockage. Any item which
is selected as an insurance item for -wholesale level stockage
is to be stocked in minimum quantities. For demand based
items, a probabilistic approach will be used to compare the
forecast cost of stocking an item with the forecast cost
incurred by not stocking the item and subsequently needing it.
Demand-based items will be considered for stocking only if
the non-stockage cost is equal to or exceeds the stockage
cost.
During the Demand Development Period (DDP) , DOD components
are required to give special management attention to newly
provisioned items in order to release restrictions placed on
initial requirements computations. The restrictions and the
use of estimated requirements factors are to be gradually re-
laxed after the first six months and dropped completely by
the end of the DDP.
Each DOD component is also required to maintain a two-
year demand history file of part numbered and not carried
stock numbered items requisitioned at the wholesale level.
The purpose of this file is to identify items for review and
possible stockage which subsequently meet the Inventory Control
Point (ICP) stockage criteria based on actual demands.
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DOD policy does not apply to war reserve range and depth
stockage.
B. PROVISIONING AT A NAVY INVENTORY CONTROL POINT
The Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) Internal Instruction
4400. 30C of 31 August 1977 defines provisioning as:
The process of determining the range and
quantity of items (i.e., spares and repair
parts, special tools, test equipment and
support equipment) required to support and
maintain an end item of material for an initial
period of service. Its phases include the
identification of items to be supported, the
establishment of data for cataloging and
inventory management, technical file loading,
technical and allowance list documentation
and the procurement and delivery of necessary
support items with related end articles. The
process involves full consideration of quality
data inputs and of necessary related actions to
assure the required quality results.
The policy and computation procedures for determining,
initial systems stock are also set forth in Instruction
4400. 30C. The basic step is the translation of Provisioning
Technical Documentation (PTD) , submitted by either a contrac-
tor or Hardware System Command (HSC) , into data elements
which represent program and item support logistics decisions
for procurement of initial system stock. Only new or non-
stocked items managed by SPCC are to be considered for stockage
during provisioning. Once an item is designated as a stocked
item and the initial buy is made, no additional wholesale
buys are made unless based on actual demands.
The basic processing for provisioning new items involves
the development of a budget constraint and determination of
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item requirements based on this constraint. A description
of the major functions performed by SPCC as outlined in
FMSO's Supply Systems Design Specifications are provided
' m this section.
1. Item Candidate Selection
Item candidate selection determines which items are
* to be considered for system stockage. This process first
checks to determine if the item is managed by SPCC; second,
if the item is a new item of supply or an established item
which is not stocked; and third, if the item is a very high
cost insurance item. If all of these conditions are met, the
item will be considered a candidate for stockage. If any one
of the above conditions is not met, the item will not be con-
sidered for stockage.
2. Demand Forecasting
Forecast of demands are made for a twelve-month
steady-state period, for a twelve-month initial period, for
a period equal to the procurement lead time, and for a period
equal to the procurement lead time plus one quarter.
For consumable items, all the demand forecasts repre-
sents expected demands during the appropriate period. For
repairable items the twelve-month steady-state demand forecast
is actually a forecast of the number of units attrited (failed
and were not repairable) during that period. The other three
demand forecasts represent expected attrition during the




Basic to the demand forecasting is the forecasting
of the schedule for installations of the end item. These
data are then smoothed into a form called "Time-Weighted
Average Month's Programs" (TWAMP) . The formulas for TWAMP




A budget constraint is next developed which serves
as a cost ceiling in the determination of items to be stocked,
This constraint is based on range and depth criteria as
specified by DOD policy for demand-based items and criteria
«
specified by the System Commands for insurance items. The
value of the constraint is the total value of the depth of
those items which qualified under the DOD criteria.
The process for determining whether an item should be
stocked as demand based is made using a technique called
COSDIF. The COSDIF technique compares the expected cost of
stocking an item to the expected cost of not stocking the
item. If the cost of not stocking the item equals or exceeds
the cost of stocking it then the item should be considered
for stocking as demand based. A description of the COSDIF
formula is provided in Appendix C.
Any item that fails to qualify for stockage as demand
based is checked next to determine if it qualifies for stock-
age as an insurance item. Insurance items are identified by
PTD as having no predicted failure rate with normal usage;
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however, should a failure occur, the lack of a replacement
item would seriously hamper the operational capability of the
system. Also, the HSC can identify insurance items which it
determines necessary to the support of its programs. Insur-
ance items will be stocked in quantities of Minimum Replace-
ment Unit (MRU) as established by PTD.
4. Item Requirements Determination
The final determination of which items to be stocked
is based on the budget constraint developed above combined
with a technique referred to as "variable threshold".
The first step in this program is to determine the
"variable threshold value" for each item which has been se-
lected as a candidate for stockage. This value is equal to
the item's probability of at least one demand during the
procurement lead time divided by its unit cost. These variable
threshold values are then listed in descending order. The
variable threshold formula is given in Appendix D.
The next step is to determine an unconstrained depth
quantity based on the procurement lead-time demand and a par-
ticular assumed demand probability distribution. A normal
distribution is used when annual or procurement lead-time
demand values are equal to or greater than twenty. For annual
demand between one and twenty, a negative binomial distribu-
tion is used. The Poisson distribution is used for annual
demand of one or less. The process begins with, the calcula-
tion of the "variable risk value" for each item. It is equal
to the item's holding cost divided by the sxom of its holding
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cost and an essentially-weighted shortage cost. This risk
is assumed to be the probability of a stockout during lead
time when the item is stocked initially to the desired depth
quantity. The depth quantity is then determined by com-
paring the risk value with probabilities of stockouts ob-
tained from the assumed probability distribution. Finally,
this unconstrained depth quantity is constrained to be no
more than two year's demand if consumable or no more than
procurement lead time plus one quarter's demand if repairable.
The final step is to actually select the items to be
stocked. All items which were determined early in the process
to be insurance items are selected first. The depth of these
items will be the MRU of the item. The total value of all
of these items is then subtracted from the funding constraint
value determined in step three above; the remaining funds are
to be allocated to the demand-based items. Selection of these
latter items begins with the items at the top of the list
made earlier and continues down the list until the total
dollar value of included depths consumes the remaining funds.
Depth for demand-based items selected are constrained as
discussed above. Any item not selected as an insurance item
or selected by the variable threshold techniques will not be
initially stocked in the system.
A simulation analysis was conducted by FMSO to determine
the most cost-effective method for establishing a range and
depth of initial stock items. This analysis evaluated a
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combination of four stock range rules and three initial depth
computations. The methods evaluated included:
1. Stocking every item to a depth of one-year's
demand
.
2. Stocking items which meet the COSDIF criterion to
a depth of lead time plus one-quarter's demand.
3. Stocking items which meet the variable-threshold
criterion to a depth of lead time plus one-quarter's demand.
4. Stocking items which have a positive reorder
point (based on UICP Risk Formula) to a depth of lead time
plus one-quarter's demand.
5. Stocking items which meet the variable-threshold
criterion to a depth equal to the initial reorder point or
at least one unit.
6. Stocking items which have a positive reorder
point to a depth equal to this initial reorder point or at
least one unit.
This study indicates that the variable threshold and
the UICP policies are most cost-effective methods. However,
the variable threshold method is more flexible and easier
to use and is the one now used at SPCC.
C. ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL STOCK NUMBER
After an item has been processed through provisioning,
SPCC assigns it a Temporary Navy Item Control Number (T-NICN)
If the item is not selected for system stock the T-NICN is
changed to a Permanent Navy Item Control Number (P-NICN) for
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cataloging purposes. SPCC indicates the type of NICN by
a coding system in the first four digits of the control
number - 0098 for T-NICN and 0099 for P-NICN.
Once an item has been selected for system stock, infor-
mation on this item is forwarded to the Defense Logistics
Service Center (DLSC) for screening. This screening opera-
tion first determines if the item has already been assigned
a National Item Identification Number (NUN) ; if no number
has yet been assigned, then a NUN is assigned to the item
at that time. A NUN is a unique nine-digit number assigned
to identify an item of supply within the Federal Cataloging
Program.
When SPCC receives a NUN as a result of DLSC screening,
they add to it a four digit Federal Supply Classification
(FSC) Number. This new thirteen digit number becomes the
National Stock Number (NSN) . The T-NICN assigned to an item
earlier is now replaced in all files by the NSN.
D. SUPPORT OF NON- STOCKED ITEMS
Items which are not system stocked as a result of the
initial provisioning are requisitioned by the customers using
the manufacturer's part number. The stock point activity
will fill this requirement by a procurement action from a
company that manufacturers this item which, in many cases,
was the original manufacturer. For this same item to be
carried in system stock, it is required to have three demands
in six months. Then theitem becomes a candidate for review
45
I
and stocking in the system. After the item is reviewed and
it is determined that the demand is of a recurring nature,
the item is assigned a NSN and procured for system stock.
The policy and procedure for reporting to the ICP these
demands on open purchase non-stocked items is set forth in
NAVSUP Notice 4400 of 2 February 1977. The activity that
procures non-stocked items from a manufacturer is required
to forward a document to the ICP for recording of demand only,
The ICP is to receive and record this data on each item in
order to determine when the item is a candidate for stock.
This document, with all of the information on the non-stocked




The Navy's Inventory Management policy is set by the Navy
Supply System Command (NAVSUP) , and has been designed and
developed by the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO) . The
system that the Navy has in operation at its Inventory Con-
trol Points (ICP) is called the Uniform Inventory Central
Program (UICP)
. The UICP system contains many procedures and
parameters to govern budget execution and the level of review
activity required for inventory management.
The Navy's UICP system is designed to determine when to
order supplies and in what quantities for each item through
the use of mathematical formulas and certain information
associated with the item. Before actual procurement of an
item, an Inventory Manager has the responsibility of reviewing
the UICP model decisions for those cases where there are
unique factors peculiar to certain items and the computer is
not programmed to consider this uniqueness.
A. UNIFORM INVENTORY CENTRAL PROGRAM
Ship Parts Control Center (SPCC) , one of the Navy's ICP,
employs UICP for control of an inventory which consists of
more than 450/000 different items having an estimated worth
of around $1,800,000/000. (12: 3) In order to mange an
inventory of this magnitude/ there are eight different opera-
tions performed by UICP. The following is a brief description
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This operation receives checks, accumulates, and
fulfills those customer's requests that cannot or should not
be satisfied at the stock point.
2. Transaction Item Reporting
This operation keeps track of the movement of the
items in the Navy's supply system. The transaction reports
are submitted by the stock points when they issue or receive
material or adjust their inventory. The transaction item
reporting operation maintains assets data and collects obser-




Cyclic Levels and Forecasting
This operation determines how much to buy or repair
and when to buy or repair. A basic part of this operation
is the computing of averages and deviations to be used in
forecasting demand, carcass return, lead time, turnaround
times, and repair service rates.
4 Planned Program Requirements
This operation establishes a record of requirements
which are known or anticipated and need not be predicted by
the UICP cyclic forecasting procedures.
5. Supply Demand Review
This operation compares current inventory assets to




6. Cyclic Repair Management
This operation forecasts repair requirements and
prepares repair schedules.
7. Stratification
This operation determines assets and forecasts





This operation takes actions to rid the inventory of
those items that are held in excess quantities.
The Master Data File (MDF) and the Weapons System
File (WSF) are the two primary data base files used by UICP
systems. These two files contain data necessary to maintain
and manage the inventory at SPCC.
The information found in the MDF is filed and indexed
using the National Item Identification Number (NUN) . Each
NUN record file in the MDF includes the current inventory
position as well as demand, carcass return, lead time, and
turnaround time observations, averages, and deviations. The
MDF also contains descriptive information such as nomencla-
ture, shelf life, and physical dimensions.
The Weapon System File (WSF) is a file of information
about the weapon systems or equipments being managed. It
contains data related to end-item weapons, systems, subsystems,
equipments, components, and sub-components. Records in the




The WSF is structured in three levels, designated as
A, B, and C. Level A has records of specific end-use weapons
or equipment. Level B has records for equipments and com-
ponents which are related to an end-use equipment. Level C
has records of equipments and components broken down into
their individual parts.
The UICP system also uses other files to support the
two major files. These files consolidate information regarding
particular supply management functions. The following is a
brief description of the seven other files.
1. Planned Program Requirements File
This file contains requirement data pertaining to
programmed needs of field activities.
2. Due On/Due Out File
This file maintains a record of ICP-directed issues






This file contains a two-year record of all trans-
actions submitted to the ICP . It is the primary source of
historical data on demands, carcass returns, lead times, and
turnaround times.
4. Document Status File
This file maintains the up-to-date records of
requisitions received at the ICP.
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5. Information History File
This file contains an accumulation of the most recent
three years of system non-recurring demand and five years of
recurring demand.
6. Program Support Interest File
This file maintains records of those items for which
SPCC has program support responsibilities but the items are
managed by another military service or Defense Logistics
Agency.
7. Back Order File
This file contains records of requisitions that could
not be satisfied from on-hand stock and the customer is
awaiting later delivery.
B. LEVELS COMPUTATIONS
The Navy's ICPs use the UICP to compute when an order
should be placed for an item and the quantity that should be
ordered. These procedures will be discussed briefly below.
A detailed flow chart of the process is given in Appendix E.
1. Order Quantity
In an attempt to better control the inventory, all
items man-ged by SPCC are distinguished by a MARK code classi-
fication. The MARK code of an item is determined by its
demand and unit cost. The five MARK code classifications are
shown in Appendix F. The MARK code designator enables the
inventory rules to be simplified since only five sets of
rules are necessary. Items that have the same MARK code
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classification are considered similar enough to be treated
alike.
Every ninety days SPCC updates forecasted demands,
lead-time averages, and other variabilities required to com-
pute the order level. The procurement order cost is deter-
mined to be one of three values from the item's MARK designa-
tor, whether or not the estimated value of the order quantity
exceeds the maximum unpriced purchase order value, and whether
the procurement is advertised or negotiated.
The procurement order cost, the forecasted quarterly
demand, the unit cost, and a fixed holding rate are used in
determining an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) . The actual
order quantity is set to be the maximum of either the EOQ,
one quarter's demand, or one unit but constrainted to be no
larger than five-year's demand.
2. Reorder Point
SPCC sets the reorder level for determining when to
place an order based on a constrained stockout risk foirmula
and a demand distribution based upon lead-time demand and
the MARK code.
3. Safety Level
The setting of a reorder quantity by definition sets
the safety level. Safety level is the difference between
the constrained reorder level and the demand during lead time.
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VI. U. S. SUPPORT OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURED EQUIPMENTS
A. MAGNITUDE OF FOREIGN EQUIPMENT SUPPORT
The Federal Supply Code for Manufacturers (FSCM) can be
used to determine the number of foreign equipments that are
supported by SPCC. The FSCM (a five-digit code) identifies
the manufacturer of a particular equipment. Any equipment
that is manufactured in the United States has a five-digit
numeric code. Those equipments that are manufactured in other
countries have an alpha-numeric code with the first digit
being the alpha-code. This alpha-code identifies the country
in which the equipment is manufactured and the remaining four
numeric digits identifies the company within that country.
A computer listing obtained from the SPCC Weapon System
File contained five hundred and thirty-two different equipments
(identified by an APL number) haveing an alpha-numeric code
for the FSCM. A duplication of this computer list was made
and has been included as Appendix G. The following is a
summary list of the FSCM letter, the country denoted by that
letter, and the number of APLs with that letter in the FSCM.








FSCM COUNTRY NO. OF APLS
S Japan 6
U United Kingdom (less England) 59
Z Australia 1
The Master APL File at the Naval Supply Center, Oakland,
was next used to determine the types of equipment produced
by these countries. These equipments covered a complete
range from very simple, such as valves and controllers with
only a few repair parts, to very complex radars, gun mounts,
etc., with a large number of spares and repair parts.
These foreign-made equipments are used on board a variety
of United States Navy Ships. Among these are the three sal-
vage tugs built in England, the Navy's new NATO Patrol Hydro-
foil (PEM) , the DD-963 class destroyers, and a number of
Military Sealift Command Ships (MSC) . With the exception of
the MSC ships, all of these equipments are cataloged and
supported by SPCC. For those equipments on MSC ships, SPCC
provides a cataloging service but does not provide any system
stock for support. Of the total number of foreign equipments
in the WSF, SPCC personnel estimate that forty percent are
used on MSC ships.
The NATO Patrol Hydrofoil, now under development, has
five foreign developed and produced equipments and systems
that require provisioning and support by SPCC. These equip-
ments are: The PL-41E GYRO (Germany) , the AN/SPS-63 True




the MK-7 5 Gun (Italy)
, and the MK-94 Fire Control System
(Holland)
.
j B. PROVISIONING METHOD FOR FOREIGN ITEMS
The provisioning process explained in Chapter IV is used
for determining initial support for both U. S. and foreign-
manufactured equipments. Because the fixed and variable costs
developed and used by SPCC are independent of where the item
is manufactured, the initial range of foreign items stocked
is probably seriously in error. The greatest error is most
likely in the ICP cost of procurement and the cost of a spot
buy in the event of a demand during stockout. Extra costs
may result in the procurement from foreign-manufactured items.
DOD Instruction 414 0.39 provides a list of functional
elements that an ICP should include in the cost of procurement
The following elements from that list would most likely in-
crease with foreign procurements:
1. Direct Labor Cost Associated with the Preparation of
the Purchase Orders and Constraints
The preparation of a solicitation for a foreign manu-
facturer may be more expensive; extra costs may result from
extra legal reviews and translations, when required.
2. Cost Involved in Administration of a Contract
An increase in administration costs may result be-
cause of larger travel and living expenses associated with
on-site visits to the manufacturing plants.
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3. Indirect Labor and Support Cost
The communication costs (Autodin, telephone, tele-
type, and mail) may be greater because of the distance between
the United States and foreign manufacturers.
C. ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL STOCK NUMBER
The procedures for assigning a NICN, before selecting
items for stock, are the same for both U. S. and foreign-
manufactured items. After a foreign item is selected for
initial system stock, information on this item is forwarded
to DLSC for screening. Until recently, any item that had a
foreign manufacturer and had not already been assigned a
NSN was rejected and sent back to SPCC for assignment of a
local control NSN.
This different procedure by DLSC affects foreign items
in three ways.
1. Items Not Assigned a NSN by DLSC
In comparing some old and new APLs of foreign equip-
ment, it was noted that many items were still identified by
the same T-NICN even after three years on the books. This
was considered to be unusual since APLs are updated every
quarter and most T-NICN are changed to NSN within a year after
information is forwarded to DLSC. In a meeting with SPCC
personnel it was determined that these items were not assigned
a NSN due to an oversign attributable to special procedures
in assigning NSN to items that DLSC rejected.
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2. Identification of Coimnon Items
The NSN that is assigned by DLSC identifies the item
regardless of the service that manages it. Any item that is
assigned a local control number does not have this same capa-
bility. Therefore, SPCC items from the foreign countries can-
not be identified to the same items that are used in another
U. S. service.
3. Identification with Other NATO Countries
Many of the foreign items that are in the U. S. inven-
tory system are also stocked by other NATO services. Since
these foreign items were not centrally assigned a stock num-
ber, like items have different numbers and cannot be identi-
fied as being similar.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum
of 18 May 1978, reported:
Effective 1 January 1978, DLSC achieved the
capability to receive and process NATO Stock
Number requests from U. S. Services/Agencies
for items of supply manufactured in the NATO
countries. This fulfills a long-standing agree-
ment among all NATO countries that: (1) each
item of supply of international use would have
only one stock number assigned; (2) the producing
countries would assign the stock number; and
(3) the NATO Stock Number would be used in
the U. S. logistics system.
This new policy and procedure has been set forth in
the Defense Integrated Data System Manual and requires the
U. S. Government contracting authorities, when purchasing
equipment from foreign sources, to cite the NATO Codification
Clause in their contracts. This clause will assure the
necessary technical documentation is acquired in order to
request the NATO Stock Number.
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The new procedure for assigning NATO Stock Number
still has DLSC screening the item to determine if a NATO
Number is assigned. However, if no number is assigned, the
information is forwarded to the producing country and it is
required to assign the item a NATO Stock Number. By having
the producing country assigning the stock number, like items
stocked by other countries will have the same stock number.
When the NATO Stock Number is returned to DLSC, it is recorded
in their records and then forwarded to the ICP.
D. FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT OF FOREIGN ITEMS
A meeting was held by Command Naval Surface Forces Pacific
in May, 1978, to discuss supply support problems of foreign
equipment used on the salvage tugs, ATS 2 and 3. The major
problem reported was a very long procurement lead time on
items that were not stocked. An example of this was the re-
placement of some non-stocked pipes and valves on these ships
during an overhaul at the Navy Ship Yard, Pearl Harbor. Be-
cause the piping system on these ships were metric, the re-
placements could not be procured from U. S. manufacturers.
Therefore, all the replacement pipes and valves had to be
ordered from England and a long lead time resulted.
Also in this meeting it was reported that the effectiveness
of foreign items that were system stocked was about the same
as that of U. S. items.
1 . Support of Stocked Items
The follow-on support of foreign-manufactured items
that are stocked during provisioning becomes part of the UICP
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system and the responsibility of the Inventory Manager.
The determination of order quantity, safety level, and
reorder point is done by the same process as that of U. S.
items. Inventory Managers at SPCC made their decisions on
when and what quantity to buy in the same for both U. S.
and foreign items.
There are some important factors not considered in
level setting of foreign items that should be examined. The
influence of these factors would cause the reorder point quan-
tity to increase which would, by definition, increase the
safety levels. These factors are: (1) The availability of
the item should that country disagree with the U. S. foreign
policy; (2) The availability of the item in time of war;
(3) Pressure cannot be as easily applied by the U. S. on a
foreign manufacturer for expediting a procurement as it can
on a U. S. manufacturer.
An attempt was not made to determine the past supply
support effectiveness of foreign-manufactured items. This
study was not done because, as previously stated, no major
problems have been reported on the support of foreign items
stocked in the supply system and because of the great amount
of time required to complete this study. To determine the
supply support effectiveness of foreign-manufactured repair
parts on the 5 32 foreign equipments managed by SPCC, the
following steps would be required.
a. Copies of the APLs for all of the equipments would
have to be obtained from the WSF.
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b. A list could then be compiled from the APLS of
the repair parts identified by NSNs
.
c. The manufacturer's part number would need to be
determined for each item in the above list. This can be done
from microfiche records at SPCC that list the different manu-
facturer's part numbers associated with each NSN. These
part numbers will be used to identify the company that has
the capability to manufacture this item.
d. Another microfiche record would be needed to
determine the items that are only manufactured in a foreign
country. This step would be required since many items are
manufactured in both the U. S. and a foreign country, and the
effectiveness analysis should be limited to those items manu-
factured solely in another country.
e. From the refined list of Step d, SPCC can provide
a two-year history of support for each item. This history
would include the total number of requisitions, the number
that was filled from available stock, and the number of
requisitions that were backordered.
2. Support of Non-Stocked Items
In reviewing the APLs of foreign equipment, it was
noted that very few items not initially stocked (identified
by P-NICN) had ever been stocked later. This was determined
by first taking a random sample of two hundred P-NICN out
of approximately four thousand repair parts. Then the P-NICNs
were checked in the MDF to deteinnine if they had been changed
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to a NSN. Out of this sample only one item had changed to
a NSN and been stocked.
An investigation was made to determine why so few of
these items had received the requisite three or more demands.
One reason, which effects both U. S. and foreign items, was
that only large supply activities, such as Naval Supply Cen-
ters and large Naval Air Stations, were required to forward
a BHJ document to the ICP. Therefore, all demands from
smaller activities, such as shipyards, tenders, and Naval
Stations, which also purchased this type of material, were
not recorded. Another reason was that not even some of the
larger activities were forwarding this required document to
the ICP. The transaction receipt records at SPCC indicated
that one Supply Center had not reported any BHJ transactions
in a six-month period, and another had reported an average of
only four transactions a month. However, a third Su-ply
Center of approximately the same size had reported in excess
of 1,500 transactions each month. The center which had re-
ported no BHJ transactions was asked why it had not forwarded
any such document to the ICP. The response was that the
document was not a part of the Uniform Automated Data Pro-
cessing System and that resources were not available to
manually prepare them.
3. Supply Support Agreements
When a foreign government buys a weapon system or
military equipment from the United States through the Foreign
Military Sales Program, that same country can also obtain a
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Supply Support Agreement (SSA) with the military service
that has the inventory management responsibility for that
system or equipment to the U. S. This agreement allows a
customer country to requisition spares and repair parts
directly from the United States. Appendix H is a sample of
the standard Supply Support Agreement Form. (17: 57)
These agreements enable the purchasing country to
maintain a lower level of inventory since backup stock is
maintained by the United States. Also a pricing system is
established to prevent manufacturers from over-charging for
spot procurements of high priority items. Although many
other governments procure equipment from the United States
and have negotiated Supply Support Agreements for this equip-
ment, the United States has yet to negotiate any similar
Supply Support Agreements with foreign countries for support




This chapter presents several alternatives by which the
Navy could obtain support for foreign-manufactured equipments
which are a consequence of the analyses in the preceding
chapters. However, prior to discussing any alternatives,
a general comment is appropriate. The Department of Defense
has the overall responsibility for establishing the policies
used by DOD components to support their equipment. There-
fore, any major changes in these policies have to be accepted
and approved by DOD. However, the Navy has some leeway within




Under this alternative, the Navy would continue
utilizing the same methods and procedures in provisioning
spares and repair parts for foreign equipment. These proce-
dures are the most cost-effective methods of determining
initial range and depth of U. S. items. In continuing the
provisioning of foreign equipment with these procedures, pro-
curement lead time may be longer than for U. S. manufacturers.
The provisioning procedures will automatically consider any
additional procurement lead time.
2. Alternative B
This alternative would use the same procedures for
provisioning items but would consider the different costs
63
(
involved when procurements are made from foreign manufacturers
The first step in implementing this alternative would be the
computation of cost parameters (ICP cost to procure, cost of
increase in unit price due to spot procurement) that repre-
sent the cost of procurement from foreign manufacturers.
These costs would be computed for each country from which the
Navy obtains equipment.
The next step would be to use these cost values in
the COSDIF formula to determine the range of items. Following
this step, the procedures for provisioning foreign items
would be the same as those for U. S. equipment.
B. FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT
1. Alternative A
Under this alternative the Navy would continue the
same policies and procedures for providing follow-on support
for foreign-manufactured items. These procedures are working
satisfactorily with the number of items now supported. By
using an accurate procurement lead-time demand on foreign
items in level setting, the system stock has apparently met




This alternative would use the same UICP system for
follow-on support of foreign items but with an increase in
the safety level. This increased protection considers the
uncertain availability of resupply from other countries.
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Reasons for this uncertainty include: (1) the foreign govern-
ment has a higherpriority for the item, (2) the foreign coun-
try's company discontinues making the item and data are not
available for a U. S. manufacturer to produce the item,
(3) the foreign country disagrees with U. S. foreign policy,
and (4) the item not being available in time of war. The
degree of uncertainty would obviously not be the same for
all countries and all times. The degree varies from very
little uncertainty for countries such as England and Germany
to much higher uncertainty for other countries.
This change in the safety level could be accomplished
easily by using a different value for the shortage cost in
the risk equation if an item is foreign manufactured. Appen-
dix I shows the associated modification to the level-setting
process of Appendix E. The only change to the present proce-
dure would be to add another decision step before setting
the value of the shortage cost.
3. Alternative C
Under this alternative the Navy would negotiate a
Supply Support Agreement with the government that produced
the equipment. The Navy would still maintain a minor inventory
of spares and repair parts to support operation. However,
this agreement could reduce much of the uncertainty in
resupply and the need for larger safety levels.
Besides reducing the safety level, other advantages
in negotiating a Supply Support Agreement are:
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a. The agreement hopefully helps establish a prior-
ity system for the requisitioning government. In the U. S.
agreements, other governments are afforded the same priority
system as any U. S. customer.
b. The agreement can provide a method of disposing
of obsolete and excess stock. The U. S. may avoid the cost
of disposing of an obsolete item should it still be required
by the other country for support of their equipment. Should
the item become obsolete to both countries, the cost is
shared
.
c. The agreement can establish a fair price system
for resupply. Other governments pay the same as U. S. cus-
tomers plus administration charges (administrative, packing,
crating, and handling) , with the exception of unit cost and
transportation, can be agreed upon in advance of procurement,
d. The agreement can provide arrangements for ware-
housing. In the U. S. agreements, if storage facilities are
adequate, there is no charge for the use of the facility.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED TOPICS
FOR FURTHER STUDY
The amount of foreign equipment supported by the Navy
at the present time is small when compared to the total
amount of equipment supported. However, as pointed out in
Chapter III, it appears likely that the number of foreign
manufactured items in the Navy supply system will increase
considerably. Both the initial and follow-on support of
such equipment has used the same methods and procedures as
that of U. S. manufactured equipment. To date, this policy
has not presented any great problems. This study has dis-
cussed some possible changes that could increase the supply
effectiveness of foreign equipment and has emphasized that
the amount of foreign equipment purchased by the U. S. will
be increasing as a consequence of our commitment to NATO.
The major conclusion and recommendation is that further
studies should be conducted on support of foreign developed
and produced equipment. The following are recommended
topics
.
A. SUPPLY SUPPORT AGREEMENTS TO AID SUPPORT OF
FOREIGN-PURCHASES EQUIPMENT
The United States has many Supply Support Agreements
with other governments. However, these agreements are for




A Study is needed on the utility of Supply Support
Agreements for equipment the U. S. obtains from other coun-
tries. Some of the questions to be answered if the United
States were to use a similar agreement for this type of
support as that provided in Appendix H are:
1. To what extent will the Navy be able to reduce its
inventory levels, and what are the savings gained by this
reduction?
2. Will supply effectiveness be affected?
3. What plitical/military problems will these Support
Agreements cause?
4. Will other countries accept the Support Agreements
to support U. S. requirements?
B. DETERMINE METHODS FOR IMPROVING THE COLLECTION OF
DATA ON NON-STOCKED ITEMS
This study pointed out that the present method used to
obtain demand on non-stocked items is ineffective for both
U. S. and foreign items. One of the inefficiencies has been
not requiring the collection of data from many activities
that procure non-stocked items. Another has been that some
of the activities required to provide this data to the ICP
have been lax in doing so.
Without an adequate method of collecting demands, the
supply system cannot be expected to adequately support the
equipments. A study is needed to either recommend alternatives
to correct the present method or to develop a completely
new system to collect the demand data.
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C. DETERMINE THE CORRECT COST VALUES TO USE IN
THE COSDIF FORMULA
SPCC now uses the same cost values in the COSDIF formula
for both U. S. and foreign procured items. As suggested in
this study, many of the costs can be expected to be different
for the procurement of foreign items. A study is needed to
determine the magnitude of these costs.
D. ALLOWANCE PREPARATION OF ON-BOARD REPAIR PARTS
OF FOREIGN EQUIPMENTS
The initial allowance of on-hand repair parts is computed
to support the ship for a ninety-day period. This process
involves the development of APLs and the combining of these
lists into a Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL)
.
A study is needed to investigate the procedures for developing
the COSAL and what effect foreign equipment has on this
allowance development. This study would be very timely be-
cause SPCC is now processing the allowance documents for the
NATO Patrol Hydrofoil (PHM)
.
E. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY SUPPORT OF FOREIGN-
MANUFACTURED EQUIPMENT
The Army has more foreign manufactured equipment than any
of the other U. S. services. Also, it has more coproduction
prgorams scheduled as illustrated in Appendix A. In order
to better support these equipments, the Army has established
an International Logistics Office. This office has both the
responsibility for support of Army equipments that the U. S.
sells to other governments and for support of equipments
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obtained from other governments . This study could make a
comparison of the different systems used to support foreign-
manufactured equipment.
F. DEVELOP A PROCEDURE TO ASSIGN NATIO STOCK NUMBERS TO
FOREIGN-MANUFACTURED ITEMS ALREADY IN THE SUPPLY SYSTEM
This study pointed out that the Defense Logistic Service
Center achieved the capability to process requests for NATO
Stock Numbers to the producing country in January, 1978.
Before that time all foreign items were assigned a local
control stock number by SPCC. A procedure is needed to
identify these foreign items and process them through DLSC
for assignment of a NATO Number. The reason for assigning
a NATO Number is to enable the U. S. to identify like items
in other U. S. and NATO services.
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Air Force Administered Agreements
F-104 Aircraft December 1965
F-4 Aircraft April 1969
F-55 Aircraft February 1973































^A reverse of the usual agreement in that the prime
contractor was in England and not the United States as it




A. F-16 AIRCRAFT - The United States and four other NATO
countries have a coproduction agreement for the F-16 aircraft.
This aircraft program will be administered by the United States
Air Force. The actual aircraft will be assembled in the
United States by General Dynamics with all five countries
providing some of the equipment. The five countries involved
are the United States, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, and
Denmark
.
B. ROLAND II - The United States along with France and
Germany are developing the Roland II Missile for coproduction.
This system would be deployed by the Army and other countries
throughout NATO.
C. RH 2 02 ASSAULT GUN - The United States Army is evaluating
the German RH 202 20 mm cannon as a replacement for the United
States M-139 20 mm single barrel gun. If the gun is selected
after this evaluation, a cooperative agreement will be made.
D. NATO PATROL HYDROFOIL MISSILE BOAT (PHM) - The PHM is a
coproduction agreement between the United States, Italy, and
Germany. The boats are being built in the United States by
Boeing with both Germany and Italy providing some of the
equipment.
E. 155 MM HOWITZER AMMUNITION - The United States, England,
Germany, and Italy have agreed to standardize the internal
ballistics of their 155 mm howitzers. This ammunition will
be produced in all of the countries, but now will have the
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same internal and external ballistics, assuring inter-







SAMPLE OF TIME-WEIGHTED AVERAGE MONTH'S PROGRAMS
The determination of system stock is based upon the time-
weighted average month's program (TWAMP) through the program
time base (PTB) . The PTB is determined by the estimation of
the value of annual demand (VAD) . If the VAD is greater than
$500,000 a PTB of three months is used. For a VAD between
$500/000 and $50,000 a PTB of six months is used and for any
VAD less than $50,000 a twelve month PTB is used. Deliveries
are assumed to occur in mid-month; thus, the cumulative pro-
gram buildup (Bm) up to and including the last month (m) in
PTB is defined as follows:
m-1




K,m are month indices
I = number of specified operational units of programK
by which the program is incremented during month K
in the PTB.
TWAMP is computed by:"
I Bm
TWAMP = "^PTB
Given an example of the following operational units




Month 1 2, 3 4
^K
1 2 2 2
Bm .5 2 4 6
Month ONDJFMAMJJAS
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1223444500
8 10.5 14 18 22 26.5 29 29
PTB TWAMP
3 Month (. 5+2+4) /3 =2.2
6 Month (.5+2+4+6+8+10.5)76 = 5.2
12 Month (.5+2+4+6+8+10.5+14+18+22+26.5+29+29)712 = 14.1
In order to derive the quantitative level requirements
for an item the TWAMP is multiplied by the number of months





Forecast for demand during Procurement Lead Time (PCLT)
on an item with a Best Replacement Factor (BRF) of 1.5 would

























COSDIF = (Fo/Fj^) [C + 2HU(R + Q) ]
+ (1 - Fo/F ) [C (D/Q) + HU(S + Q/2) + C^F^]
- (1 - Fo/Fj^) [KCpF^ + PDU + Fj^L MAX i^^/
^^^^
^ S 5F ^) ]
Where
:
Fo/Fj-j = probability of zero demand in coming two years,
given annual frequency of demand F
C = ICP cost of procure
H = holding cost rate
U = item unit price
R = reorder level
Q = economic order quantity
D = forecast of annual demand
S = Safety level
C- = cost of issue
F = annual frequency of demand
K = conversion factor to adjust procurement cost for
non-stocked items
P = increase in item unit price due to spot buy
L = procurement lead time
X = shortage cost
E = item essentiality
115 is based on average backorder time outstanding in days
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The first part of the COSDIF formula is the probability
of no demand in two years multiplied by the expected cost to
hold that item in inventory for two years. The next part
of the formula is the probability of demand in two years
multiplied by the holding cost for that item for one year.
The third part of the formula is the probability of demand
in two years multiplied by the expected cost of not stocking













P = Probability that one or more demands will occur
during a lead time per dollar invested
D = forecast of quarterly demand
L = lead time (in quarters)





REORDER POINT DETERMINATION FLOW CHART
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D = Quarterly demand
LT = Lead time forecast for procurei
in quarters
dlt = Demand duilng lead time
w = Average requisition in quarter
PPV = Procurement problem variance
/^ = Variance
^^D = Variance in demand
d^LT = Variance in lead time
MAD = Mean absolute deviation
^ = Shortage cost
S = Average requisition size
I = Inventory holding rate
c = Cost of item
E = Item essentiality




























































































































































LIST OF APLS WITH FOREIGN FSCM
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00240100 K3339 002401400 K3339
002405100 K3330 002405400 K3339
006070001 A0199 013050001 D8266
016031788 K2331 016032359 K0084
016032360 K0084 016032361 K0084
016032363 K0084 016032376 K0084
016032377 K-084 016032378 K0084
016032379 K0084 016032380 K0084
016032381 K0084 016032382 K0084
016032383 K0084 018240001 K2374
018240002 K2374 018240003 K2374
018240004 K2374 018270001 K2267
018270002 K2267 018270003 K2267
018270004 K2267 018270005 K2267
018400001 U0789 018400002 U0789
018470001 K4001 018470002 K4001
018510001 D8860 018880146 N0897
018880147 N0897 018880148 D8860
018880149 D8860 018880150 D8860
018880154 U1494 019990015 U1068









019990030 K5184 032200014 U1841
032200015 U1841 032230016 ' U1841
032230017 U1841 039990011 D8046
052060001 K0680 053990001 K0357
061900375 K0084 069990005 K1555
079990031 K1795 099990033 K1847
103160004 K6729 119990012 D9645
119990015 D4856 152210028 K1847
152210029 K1847 152210030 K1847
152210031 K1847 152210032 K1847
152210033
- K1847 152210034 K1847
152210035 K1847 152210036 K1847
152210037 K1847 152210038 K1847
152210039 K1847 152210040 K1847
152210041 K1847 152210042 K1847
152210043 K1847 152210044 K1847
152210045 K1847 152210046 K1847
152210047 K1847 152210048 K1847
152210049 K1847 152210050 K1847
152210051 K1847 152210052 K1847
152210053 K1847 152210054 K1847
152210055 K1847 152210056 K1847
152210057 K1847 152210058 K1847









152210064 K1847 152210065 K1847
152210066 K1847 152210067 K1847
152210068 K1847 152210069 K1847
152210070 K1847 L52210071 K1857
161390001 K2273 161390002 K2273
161390003 K2273 161390004 K2273
161470001 K1847 166400001 D1305
175880028 K1847 17588029 K1847
175880030 K1847 175880031 K1847
175880032 K1847 175880033 K1847
175880034 K1847 175880035 K1847
175880036 K1847 175880037 K1847
175880038 K1847 175880039 K1847
175880040 K1847 175880041 K1847
175880042 K1847 175880043 K1847
175880044 K1847 175880045 K1847
175880046 K1857 175880047 K1847
175880048 K1847 175880049 K1847
175880050 K1847 175880051 K1847
175880052 K1847 175880053 K1847
175880054 K1847 175880055 K1847
175880056 K1847 175880057 K1847
175880058 K1847 175880059 K1847









175880064 K1847 175880065 K1847
175880066 K1847 175880067 K1847
175880068 K1847 175880069 K1847
175880070 K1847 175880071 K1847
175880072 K1847 175880073 K1847
175880074 K1847 175880075 K1847
175880076 K1847 175880077 K1847
175880078 K1847 175880079 K1847
175880080 K1847 175880081 K1847
175880082 K1847 175880083 K1847
175880084 K1847 175880085 K1847
175880086 K1847 175880087 K1847
175880088 K1847 177110001 K2246
179990042 D9695 179990043 D9596
179990044 S0557 179990045 N0520
179990046 H9143 179990048 S0557
179990049 S0562 199990073 K1847
199990074 K0059 219990933 K5921
219990951 K3767 219990989 K4841
229990083 K6504 229990084 K6504
229990124 N0200 239990396 K4779
259990012 D4856 259990013 D4856
270430001 K2273 270430002 K2273









270430007 K2273 270430008 K2273
270430009 K2273 270430010 K2273
270430012 K2273 270430014 K2273
270430015 K2273 270430016 K2273
270430017 K2273 279990064 D2332
279990066 D9645 279990067 D9465
279990068 D9645 279990069 D2332
279990070 D2332 279990074 D2332
279990075 D2332 318880019 K4661
319190151 K0781 326490001 U0829
328880137 U1886 328880149 D9695
328880150 D9695 328880151 D9695
328880152 D9695 348880006 U0721
348880007 U0721 348880008 U0721
350120001 K5163 358880003 K0385
369990001 N0268 371010257 U1570
371020546 U1570 371020547 K6504
371020548 K6504 383600001 U0141
383600002 U0141 390590007 K7509
399990001 D9695 399990002 D9695
401040002 S0511 401080001 U0829
408880082 K2582 408880083 K2582
412580002 D2516 412580003 D2516









450320001 K3062 450330001 K5679
459990249 S3324 469990108 K1350
481510009 U0834 481510010 U0834
481510011 U0834 481510012 U0334
i
481510013 U0834 481520001 K0527
481530001 K4718 481580001 K2980
481580002 K2980 481680001 D8086
481680002 D8086 481920001 K6539
;
481920002 K6539 481930001 U1897
481970001 D8266 500960001 U0829
1
509990369 K6504 509990370 K7015
509990376 K3767 509990498 K1847
' 578880037 N0554 578880038 N0554
601050002 K0754 611800214 K1488
611800215 K1488 611800216 N1488
611800217 K1488 611800218 K1488
611800219 K1488 611800220 K1488
617200001 K3767 617220005 D9695
619710001 K4668 619710002 K4668
619710003 K4668 619710004 K4668
619990116 K2150 629990018 K7 33"5
664090003 U0040 664150001 D8266
667800004 U1476 667800005 U1476








690250001 K3469 693160009 D0812
698880034 K1045 702110003 K6255
740150001 U1494 751200014 U1640
751220004 U0834 751220005 U0834
751280001 K2980 751280002 K2980
751280003 K2980 751280004 K2980
' 751280006 K2980 751280007 K2980
751280008 K2980 751280009 K2980
751300001 K4269 755320001 K6758
781120001 K1279 789990357 D8266
789990358 DlOOl 789990359 DlOOl
800030001 K1226 831000186 K3916
831030001 N0024 833001011 H9064
833001012 H9064 833001013 H9064
833001014 H9064 833001015 H9064
833001016 H9064 833001017 H9064
833001018 H9064 833001019 H9064
833001020 H9064 83301022 H9064
833001023 H9064 83301024 H9064
833001025 H9064 833001026 H9064
833001027 H9064 833001028 H9064
834010044 D2480 834010045 D0735
834010048 D2049 834010049 D2049








K 834010067 834010068 N0329
834010069 N0329 834900023 D2049
834900025 D2049 85000905 S0293
853160293 K5614 85160294 K5614
85160295 K5614 853160297 K5614
859990759 K4661 859990771 K0667
859990793 K7335 859990801 U0507
' 882003230 K3062 882003532 K2980
882036433 K3062 882036434 K3062
! 882036472 U1892 882036526 K2911
' 882036593 K2980 882036595 K2980
' 882036599 K2980 882036637 K2980




882036691 K2980 882036695 K1624
882037781 K2980 882037782 K2890
882037786 K6752 882037787 K2980
882046946 K3062 882047121 K2980
882047195 K2980 882047196 K2980
882047197 K2980 882047198 K2980
882047994 K2980 882047995 K2980
882047996 K6752 882056431 K3062
882056494 K2911 882056495 K2911
882056558 K2980 882056561 K2980









882056575 K2980 882056576 K2980
882056662 K2980 882056663 K2980
882056664 K2980 882056665 K2980
882056666 K2980 882056667 K2980
882056668 K2980 882056669 K2980
;
882056670 K2980 882056671 K2980
882056672 K2980 882056673 K2980
I
882056674 K2980 882056675 K2980
' 882056682 K2980 882056683 K2980
' 882056684 K2980 882056686 K2980
882056687 K2980 882056688 K2980
882056689 K2980 882056690 K2980
882057423 K2980 882057424 K2980
882057425 K2980 882057426 K2980
882057427 K2980 882071755 K2980
882072028 K0667 882072029 K0667
882072039 K7735 882072040 K7735
882072041 K0667 882081146 K2980
882081148 K2980 ^ 882081153 K2980
882081261 K1507 882095322 K2980
882095369 U1892 882095373 K1126
882095877 K1567 882095926 K2150
882095936 J2980 882095937 K0222
882095944 K2980 882095945 K0201









882182778 Z0280 882191372 U2086
882191373 U2086 882191381 K3012
882191382 K3012 882191779 K0310
882191781 K6752 882191782 K6752
' 882191805 K2150 882191806 K2150
882191807 K2150 882233629 U1892
882234432 K5184 882234433 K3329
882234438 K4661 882234440 K5184
882234441 K5184 882234458 K0667
882234460 K7674 882234486 K0092
882234493 K1076 882234510 K4694
' 882241507 U1892 882241508 U1892
882241552 K3455 882241583 K6843
882241769 K4661 882241770 K4661
882241783 D9695 882241815 K6752
882241824 U1587 882241831 U1640
882280355 U1892 882280356 U1892
882280357 U1892 882303566 K0259
882352357 K6752 883114844 K2206
883114845 K2206 883115021 K2980
883115022 K2980 883115023 K2980
883115029 K5473 883115078 K2980
883115080 K2980 883115081 K2980








883116496 K2980 883116497 K2980
883116498 K6752 883116499 K1695
883116500 K6752 883116501 K2980
883116502 K2980 883116503 K6752
883116506 K2150 883116507 K2150
!
883116521 K2980 883116572 K5184
883116650 K2980 883116673 U1587
[
889901016 K1279 889901027 U1892
;
889901028 U1892 950013775 K4914
950013860 D2081 950013982 K4914
950014223 K4914 950014284 D8046
950014571 U0413 95004571 U0413
950064571 U0413 . 950074571 U0413
950194397 D9348 954010004 K0160
95406004 K0160 999971803 D2332
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COOPERATIVE LOGISTICS ARRANGEMENT REGARDING SUPPLY
SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF OF THE




The purpose of this arrangement is to enable the Govern-
ment of to utilize the organization,
facilities and administrative procedures employed by the
United States to support Government of
specified item common to the Armed Forces of the two Govern-
ments on a basis which will:
A. Permit the Government of to
obtain logistic support for its military forces equivalent
to that provided U. S. Forces for similar common items.
B. Reimburse the U. S. for all expenses incurred in
providing defense articles, supplies and services to the
Government of in accordance with
provisions contained herein.
II . Material Requirements
A. The Government of will provide
planning information to the United States, on a timely basis,
in order to enable the United States to increase and maintain
U. S. stock levels, and an order levels, so as to provide the
same levels of supply support for the Government of
as for the U. S. Armed Forces.
B. The United States will provide the Government of
with a listing of the material required
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to be on hand and on order in the U. S. supply system for
the Government of
. The Government of
re(3uirements will be computed by the
United States utilizing rates estimated to be applicable to
Government of forces, so as to insure
that stocks are maintained at the levels required to provide
Government of supply support equivalent
to that provided to the United States. While original esti-
mates of requirements for repair parts will be based on United
States estimates of Government of consumption,
subsequent estimates will be based on Government of
demands. Any reduction by the Government of
to the prescribed stock levels will
result in a commensurate reduction to the supply support of
the item to the Government of
.
C. As requested by the Government of
the United States will provide the Government of
technical assistance in the determination of
material requirements for Government of
stock levels, and on order levels, and annual deliveries.
III. Orders
A. Stock Levels — Utilizing established United States
procedures, the Government of will
place a Military Assistance Sales Order (MASO) , specifying
items and quantities, with the United States military authori-
ties in an amount to cover the estimated total cost of material
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to be held on hand and on order (and of the services required
to increase United States spare parts stock and on order
levels) to meet Government of ^ demands.
B. Consumption - (1) The Government of
will place an open-end MASO, undefined as to items and quan-
tities, with the United States military authorities utilizing
established United States procedures, in an amount equivalent
to the estimated first calendar quarter's consumption. This
order will be supplemented each subsequent quarter, at least
thirty days prior to the beginning therof, to cover the
subsequent quarter's anticipated withdrawals. Such orders
and supplements will be limited to a calendar year. Immediately
following the close of each calendar year, the orders for
such calendar year will be closed out and liquidated.
(2) On a date to be mutually agreed and on or before
this same date of each succeeding year, the Government of
will collaborate with United States
authorities and provide an annual estimate of consumption
requirements for the following year, specifying items and
quantities, for which incremental and supplemental orders
referred to in sub paragraph (1) hereof can be expected.
C. The Government of , will, as may
be agreed amend the MASO (A and B above) , to cover increases
or decreases in (1) stock levels held by the United States
for the Government of , (2) in procurement
levels, and (3) Government of consumption
requirements. The necessity for these amendments will be
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mutually determined, based on demand history, new items
entering the system, and revisions in prices.
D. The Government of will place an
open-end MASO on the United States military authorities at
the beginning of each calendar year to cover the following
year's maintenance and modifications of material in storage,
if any, and costs of storage at rates developed by the United
States for specific classes of supply of material held in
stock for Government of
.
IV. Requisitions and Issues
The Government of will forward
its requisitions from one central point and will place such
requisitions, using the United States Military Standard
Requisition and Issue Procedure (MILSTRIP) , upon points desig-
nated by the United States authorities. Stock requisitioned
will be issued from supply points within United States
Military System. The Government of will
provide transportation from United States issue points to
the Government of destinations.
Documents and procedures used by the United States for invoicing
and issuing will be compatible with those used by the United
States Armed Services. Invoices will be computed utilizing
the "standard" United States military price prevailing at the




A. Requisitions placed by Government of
with the United States supply system before stock levels have
been increased will be filled from existing United States
stock to the extent that United States inventory levels are
adequate to permit supply.
B. Upon attainment by the United States of the increase
in United States stock levels referred to in Article III,
support will be provided to the Government of
in the same manner and on the same priority basis as provided
to United States Armed Forces with similar missions for common
equipment. The Government of will assist
in the verification of high priority requirements submitted
by military units when such verifi-
cation is requested by the United States.
C. Where United States stock levels are insufficient to
meet Government of demands, due to
Government of reduction of United
States proposed levels (Article II-B) , requisition will be
filled in the same manner as those referred to in Paragraph A
of this article.
VI. Storage and Modification
A. Government of stocks of material
held in the United States system will not be physically
separated, or otherwise physically identified.
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B. The quality of material furnished by the United
States to Government of
_^ will be identical
in all respects to that furnished to the United States Armed
Forces, including all maintenance and modifications work,
which normally will be accomplished before material is issued.
In those cases where material previously issued requires
modification, the Government of may
at its own option order the required modification kits in
accordance with normal Military Assistance Sales Procedures.
VII. Obsolete And Excess Stocks
A. If a common item becomes obsolete or excess to
Government of requirements, but
not to the United States, the Government of
may request the United States to consider cancellation of its
order and to apply its equity in the undelivered quantity
to subsequent orders for other items. If the United States
does not agree to the cancellation, the Government of
will, upon modification by the United States,
withdraw the undelivered quantity, or arrange for the United
States to dispose of such undelivered quantity with the net
proceeds to be credited to the Government of
B. If a common item becomes obsolete or excess to United
States requirements, but not to the Government of
the United States may request the Government of
to withdraw from United States stocks
its undelivered quantity of such common items. The Government
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o^ ^^y purchase additional quan-
tities of such common items, from existing United States
stocks, at a fair price to be mutually agreed upon, which
will not in any case exceed the United States standard price
of the item. The Government of
, with
the approval of the United States may place a final order
for spare parts in sufficient quantity and type to support
the equipment for its probably remaining useful life with
the Government of
.
C. If a common item becomes obsolete or excess to the
requirements of both the Government of
and the United States, the Government of
will, upon modification by the United States withdraw its
undelivered quantity from the United States facilities;
alternatively, at the request of the Government of
, the United States will dispose of such common
items in accordance with United States procedures and credit
the Government of with the Government
of proportionate share of the net
proceeds
.
D. The term "undelivered quantites", as used herein,
will be considered to be the quantity the United States has
on hand and on procurement for the Government of




A. Upon request of the United States, the Government of
will, to the extent compatible with
Government of^ supply requirements,
sell to the United States common items delivered to the
Government of ^__ under these arrangements
at a fair price to be mutually agreed upon which will not in
any case exceed the price at which the item was sold to the
Government of plus the cost of any
modification perofrmed at the expense of the Government of
and accessorial charges. Transporta-
tion will be furnished by the United States.
IX. Stock Losses
Losses to common items stored in United States facilities
resulting from natural phenomena, enemy action, normal stor-
age operations, or other accidents or casualties, that have
been determined to have accurred due to no fault or negligence
of United States personnel, will be assessed proportionately
against the United States and Government of
in accordance with their respective interests therein. Charges
submitted under this provision will include a certification
that such losses were not due to fault or negligence of United
States personnel.
X. Expansion of Facilities
Any additional capability needed to accommodate stocks
ordered by Government of under
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these arrangements may be provided by agreement between the
United States and Government of for
expansion of facilities at Government of
expense. If it is not possible to reach mutual agreement on
all aspects (including financing) of such action to expand
United States facilities, the United States commitment will
be limited to fulfilling Government of re-
quirements within the capacity of existing United States
facilities not required for United States requirements.
XI . Funding
A. With regard to the MASO's referred to in Article III
A, and amendments thereto, referred to in Article III C,
the Government of undertakes to make
funds available to the United States in such amounts and at
such times as required by the United States (1) to pay for
material available in existing inventories of the United
States to meet the requirements, and (2) to meet payments
required by contracts placed for the remainder of the material
included in such MASO's and for services required, plus any
damages and costs that may accrue from the cancellation of
any contracts resulting from changes requirements of the
Government of in advance of the
time such payments, damages or costs are due. In the case
of (2) above, the Government of will,
subject to the foregoing undertaking provisionally make pay-
ment each month at the rate of 1/12 of the value of the on-order
113

portion of the stock level required to be held on hand,




concurrently make payments to the United States for the cost
of positioning and issuing such stocks from United States
depots in amounts in accordance with costs developed by the
United States for specific classes of supply.
B. In order to provide funds to cover anticipated with-
drawals by the Government of will
make payments in full concurrently with placement of orders,
and amendments thereto, referred to above in Article III B
(1) and III C respectively.
C. Bills covering the preceding calendar quarter for
storage, maintenance and modification of stocks (Article III
D) will be submitted at the end of each quarter, payment in
full will be made by Government of
within sixty days after submission of such bills.
D. A charge of 5% of the cost of each MASO, excluding
packing, crating, handling and transportation, placed in
accordance with Article III, will be added to cover manage-
ment overhead costs of the United States resulting from
Government of use of the United
States Supply System. Termination transactions will not
include 5% system charge.
E. Subject to the foregoing, billing and collection




XII. Effective Date and Termination
A. This arrangement will be effective when signed and
may be mutually reviewed at the end of calendar year
At that time, and at the end of any calendar year thereafter,
either government may terminate activity under these arrange-
ments; by giving the other government at least 18 days of
notice of termination. During the period between such notice
and the termination date, the Government of
requisitions, if any, will be submitted in the normal manner.
All requisitions submitted by Government of
and accepted by the United States prior to the termination
date will be filled by the United States in the normal manner
regardless of whether the termination date will have passed.
Subject to the filling of such requisitions, the provisions
of Article VII will apply, after the termination date, to
the disposition of the Government of
equity in the undelivered quantity of each common item
covered by the arrangement.
B. In the event of termination of these arrangements,
the United States agrees to release to the Government of
those installations which the
Government of has funded for
major improvements or construction, or, if it is necessary
for the United States to retain the facility, to negotiate
a fair residual value settlement.
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XIII. Service Implementing Procedures
Service Implementing Procedures as may be required to
implement these arrangements will be entered into by the
military agencies of the Government of the United States and
the Government of on a "Service to
Service" level.
These arrangements are prepared in duplicate in English
and in the languages, both texts
equally authentic.
Done at this day
of
, 19 .
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